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From Apology to Utopia and The Inner Life of International Law 
 
Akbar Rasulov* 
 
Introduction 
 
 
A certain body of lore has emerged in recent years around Martti Koskenniemi’s 1989 
volume ‘FROM APOLOGY TO UTOPIA: THE STRUCTURE OF INTERNATIONAL LEGAL ARGUMENT’ (hereafter 
FATU).1  Stripped to its basics, it tells us that FATU is essentially a work of postmodernist 
scholarship;2 that its intellectual genealogy goes back simultaneously to the Harvard critical 
legal studies (CLS) tradition and the Yale school of policy science;3 that, even though it 
speaks at such length about the ‘ethics of responsibility’ and ‘reconstructing the rules’,4 it 
actually provides a typical illustration of the so-called ‘deconstructivist approach’;5 that it is a 
product of a ‘rebel[lion] without a cause’;6 and that its single most significant contribution to 
the field of international legal theory lies in its analysis of international law’s liberal origins 
and its discussion of the phenomenon of legal indeterminacy.7 In this essay I seek to 
challenge and displace this set of narratives. My principal aim in doing so is to reclaim what I 
believe to be FATU’s most important theoretical legacy: a highly novel and very powerful 
argument in defence of the anti-anti-disciplinarian theoretical agenda in the field of 
academic international legal studies (AILS).  
 
My main objective in these pages is essentially twofold. In the first place, I aim to 
problematize the traditional image of FATU as ‘purely a work of legal theory’. In the second 
place, I intend also to recover its original intellectual project, by excavating it from beneath 
that mountain of misreadings and misrememberings under which it has come to be so 
unceremoniously buried over the last quarter-century. As with every other landmark text, 
one could argue, of course, that these misintepretations and misreadings have long since 
become a part of FATU’s broader historical identity, an integral element of its ‘living 
meaning’. Be that as it may. It is not my intention in these pages to debate the rights of 
invented traditions and fabricated memories to endure and persist. Every historical identity 
is open to renegotiation. Not all misreadings, however well-intentioned or inspired, deserve 
to go unchallenged. If all interpretation, as Jameson argues, is like ‘a Homeric battlefield’, 
and no narrative can be ‘effectively disqualified … by a simple enumeration of inaccuracies 
or omissions’, then the only appropriate response is to attack: ‘only another, stronger 
interpretation can overthrow and refute an interpretation already in place.’8  Or, as 
                                                          
* School of Law,University of Glasgow. 
1 MARTTI KOSKENNIEMI, FROM APOLOGY TO UTOPIA (1989; rev.edn.2006). All references 
hereafter are to the revised edition. 
2 Andreas Paulus, International Law after Postmodernism, 14 LJIL 727(2001). 
3 CHINA MIEVILLE, BETWEEN EQUAL RIGHTS 48-50(2005). 
4 FATU,546-61. 
5 Iain Scobbie, Towards the Elimination of International Law, 61 BYIL 
339(1990). 
6 Jason Beckett, Rebel without a Cause?, 7 German LJ 1045 (2006). 
7 James Crawford, ‘Chance, Order, Change’, 365 RCADI 115-34(2013); MIEVILLE, 
supra n.3,52-9. 
8 FREDRIC JAMESON, THE POLITICAL UNCONSCIOUS xiii(2002). 
2 
 
Bourdieu would have said, one has to bend the stick with vigorous enough force if one wants 
to ‘correct the previous bias.’9  
 
In the pages ahead I propose a decidedly vigorous interpretation of FATU. The traditional 
reputation of FATU as a work of postmodern legal scholarship, I contend, is utterly 
unjustified. To accept it at its face value would be to misunderstand completely not only the 
broader disciplinary vision its author sought to realise and the highly peculiar legal-theoretic 
conjuncture in the context of which he developed it, but also the basic theoretical apparatus 
he deployed in executing his vision and the common genealogy of the various intellectual 
traditions he recruited for that purpose. Far from being a manifestation of any kind of 
postmodernist sensibility, I would like to argue, the FATU project, in fact, represents the 
exact opposite of it. Despite the occasional deployment of some standard postmodernist 
vocabularies in its introductory pages, in the broader taxonomy of contemporary 
international legal scholarship FATU belongs firmly on the ‘other side of the barricades’. 
Whatever the author of FATU may have thought about the work of postmodern thinkers as a 
matter of his private intellectual tastes, as a practitioner of the public craft of international 
legal scholarship, he was, without a doubt, a card-carrying traditionalist through-and-
through.  
 
The theoretical dimension of my argument has three main parts:  
 
1. Methodological part. In order to understand its specific character as an act of 
theoretical practice, one must approach FATU not as a symptom of some grand historical 
process, such as, for instance, the rise of legal structuralism or the arrival of CLS into AILS, 
but as a direct reflection of its author’s immediate individual intra-disciplinary circumstances, 
including not least his sense of disquiet in the face of an increasing disintegration of 
international law’s traditional epistemological and ideological foundations and his 
subsequent decision to counter that trend by publishing an academic treatise.  
 
2. Historiographical part. From the historical point of view, it is precisely in these micro-
level ‘personal’ circumstances that one has to search for the key to FATU’s basic intellectual 
project. To put it in a slightly telegraphic fashion: in terms of its overall theoretical design, 
the FATU project can be essentially said to follow the classical model of Applied Sciences, at 
the centre of which lies the principle of eradicating the gap between the discourse of 
academic theory and the discourse of practical knowledge. In the context of AILS, as it came 
to be understood by FATU’s author, the most efficient way to accomplish this objective was 
to produce a new dual-use analytical framework that could be deployed in practice with 
equal facility by academic international lawyers and international legal practitioners alike. 
The sharing of this framework by the two communities, went the implicit assumption, would 
provide international law with a new platform from which it could rebuild its disintegrating 
disciplinary and ideological foundations. In the event, the general blueprint for the 
construction of such a framework was found in the simultaneous execution of three closely 
interconnected moves: (i) a highly creative re-imagination of the traditional enterprise of 
legal positivism, ie the legal science move; (ii) the inauguration of the idea that, ontologically 
speaking, international law is all just one large field of frenzied discursive scrambles, ie the 
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discourse theory move; and(iii) the explicit assertion that every such scramble in practice 
follows a certain set of ‘rules of engagement’ that apply as unfailingly in the field of doctrinal 
debates as they do in legal policy discourse, ie the legal semiotics move. 
 
3. The history of legal thought part. Far from being a monument to any kind of 
postmodernist project, FATU represents the product of an utterly conventional – from the 
AILS’s internal point of view – disciplinary enterprise. Both in terms of its general theoretical 
ambition and in terms of its specifically jurisprudential aesthetics, the FATU project follows 
directly in the footsteps of what can be called the study of the inner life of the law 
tradition.10 Historically, the main champions of this tradition were the followers of the late-
19th-century German legal science and dogmatische Rechtswissenschaft movement.11 One 
also finds its traces, however, in the work of the early 20th-century analytical jurisprudes, like 
Henry Terry and Wesley Hohfeld, and the interwar legal positivists and legal-realist scholars, 
like Hans Kelsen and Karl Llewellyn. In international law, the equivalent genealogy is slightly 
more difficult to establish – for most of its history, AILS was a theoretical wasteland – but the 
main hero-figure here too is Kelsen, accompanied, in later periods, by Myres McDougal and, 
possibly, Georg Schwarzenberger.  
 
 
The Ideology of the FATU Project: The Enterprise of Critique and the Challenge of Speaking 
to Practical Experiences 
 
 
What was the basic ideology of the FATU project? As tends to be so often the case with such 
kind of endeavours, the best way to start answering this question would be to turn not to 
the FATU text itself but to another piece of writing published by the same author: a brief 
introductory essay he wrote for the 2003 volume of the European Journal of International 
Law about the life and work of the Danish legal-realist scholar, Alf Ross.  
 
There is a curious passage that appears roughly halfway through it which I think deserves 
our attention. Here is how it starts:   
 
In some ways, as H.L.A.Hart and others have shown, [the legal] realist insights 
seem always to be beside the point for answering questions made to 
practising lawyers. The external perspective offered by realism may increase 
self-awareness and sharpen critical ability. But it does not provide responses 
to ‘internal’ questions about valid law. ... This is why realists did not succeed 
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from such ways of looking upon law from the outside as philosophy, history, 
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in revolutionising the discipline ... despite all the theoretical fury, and the 
dismissive tone of voice.12  
 
A rather familiar move, it would seem: ever since the days of Oppenheim and McNair, one of 
the most popular pastimes among international lawyers has been to chide international legal 
theorists for losing sight of the everyday realities inhabited by their practitioner cousins. But 
note now where the argument suddenly turns next: 
 
The realists conceived of their enterprise in terms of a fundamental critique. 
In this they were both right and wrong. They were right to the extent that 
their insights did undermine much of the academic abstraction that underlay 
professional routines. … But they were wrong to think that such a new theory 
should – or could – have immediately led into new routines, other legal idioms 
or ways of assessing legal competence. Practising lawyers continued 
stubbornly to talk about ‘sovereignty’, ‘human rights’ or ‘binding force’. 
Somehow, realism failed to answer questions that defined the jobs in which 
practising lawyers were involved.13  
 
How remarkable, this! – to declare that a disciplinary revolution could never be achieved if 
one only pursued the enterprise of fundamental critique and did not answer those questions 
in terms of which legal practitioners defined their jobs and constructed their professional 
lives; to announce that the writing of legal theory may be a project that is as useful as it is a 
waste of time; that for an international law scholar to focus on subverting the established 
academic dogmas without creating at the same time new routines and new legal idioms is, 
effectively, a recipe for professional failure. Let us pause for a moment here. Consider again 
whose pen these statements come from. This is not some random provincial professor living 
out his intellectual insecurities in print or a semi-retired ICJ judge venting his anger at history 
moving too fast for his liking. This is a scholar who by the time he publishes these lines 
already for more than a decade has been widely recognised as one of the leading 
international legal theorists of his age, an author whose very first book, infact, opens with 
the announcement that every foray into international law must of necessity also be an 
exercise in legal theory.14  
 
How can one make sense of this apparent pattern of contradiction? The easiest way to 
respond to this probably would be to argue something to the effect that ‘the Martti 
Koskenniemi of 2003’ was not really the same person as ‘the Martti Koskenniemi of 1989’. 
Looking at some of the passages in the 2006 epilogue to the Cambridge reissue of FATU,15 
there certainly would seem to be more than enough evidence to lend support to this 
argument were one to take it with any degree of seriousness. And yet, as plausible as this 
                                                          
12 Martti Koskenniemi, Introduction: Alf Ross  and Life beyond Realism, 14 
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theory had, in fact, a rather limited purchase since ‘international law is 
not a theoretical discipline’ and taking its normative foundations 
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interpretation may seem in the abstract – it certainly wouldn’t be the first time that a 
prominent international lawyer had had a change of mind about something and decided to 
advertise that fact in print – I don’t find it very convincing. The ‘two Koskenniemis’ thesis is, 
to put it simply, a fiction. Whether one takes Professor Koskenniemi’s writings from the early 
1990s or from the mid-2000s, a very palpable sense of continuity seems to connect all his 
different projects during this time, both at the level of what one might call their general 
theoretical economy and in terms of their basic ideological signatures. Indeed, if one looks at 
the essential logic behind FATU’s basic theoretical practice, a very strong case can, in fact, be 
made that, for all his regular detours into abstract philosophical discussions, the author of 
FATU would most certainly have agreed with the general message put forward in the Ross 
essay: it is not the business of any genuinely critical disciplinary project to (only) do critical 
legal theory.      
 
 
From ‘High Theory’ to ‘Applied Science’: FATU’s Place in Contemporary International Legal 
Scholarship  
 
 
Unlike most writers who had commented over the years on the legal-realist project, the 
author of the Ross essay knew exactly what it was that realism failed at. He knew it because 
he, too, had sought to cross the exact same disciplinary terrain. Where realism had failed, 
however, he did not.  
 
Unlike the vast majority of AILS scholars before and after him, Martti Koskenniemi did not 
succeed in developing a legal-theoretic construct that failed to address the intellectual needs 
of an international legal practitioner. Quite on the contrary: the very first task he had set out 
to resolve in his career was to tackle precisely that specific challenge.   
 
Consider once again his main claim in the Ross essay. Realism was very successful when it 
came to undermining the old abstractions of academic thought. Where it failed, though, was 
in not realising that such a displacement could not by itself automatically trigger the 
emergence of ‘new routines, legal idioms, or ways of assessing legal competence’, i.e. the 
development of precisely those kinds of theoretical products whose main consumers were 
to be found outside the domain of professional academia. The moment it came to ignore this 
fact its fate as a disciplinary phenomenon was sealed.  
 
Like so many other movements before and after it, realism had failed to recognise that, 
structurally, the AILS community has never been the culturally hegemonic sector of the 
international legal profession(ILP). To induce any kind of disciplinary shift, thus, it could 
never be enough to focus the thrust of one’s efforts only on the plane of the professional 
academic discourse. It is not in the domain of ‘high legal theory’ that international law’s 
intellectual culture is produced and articulated. The focal point of one’s intervention rather 
must fall on what Diego Lopez-Medina in a slightly different context calls the order of pop 
jurisprudence, that is to say, the common juristic sense shared among the non-theoretically 
proficient segments of the ILP community.16 For it is there and there alone that all the 
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various projects and practices through which the ILP community constitutes itself merge into 
a single common discursive space.  
 
To get a full sense of FATU’s towering achievement as an act of legal scholarship – to glimpse 
the full scope of its sheer chutzpah and ambition – one must start precisely with this point. 
What was it that the author of FATU had sought to accomplish in his work? What was it also 
that separated his intellectual project so radically from everything that came before and 
after it? The answer to both of these questions is to be found in the idea of pop 
jurisprudence. What the author of FATU recognised from the very outset – and what the 
author of the Ross essay later lamented the realists never did – was that the key to winning 
any kind of intra-disciplinary theoretical struggles in modern international law lies in 
producing not just a new set of critical-theoretic ideas accessible primarily to professional 
legal academics, but a new system of intellectual tools and concepts accessible above all to 
the community of international legal practitioners: a system of tools and concepts which the 
practising lawyers could use to describe and express their day-to-day professional 
experiences and anxieties. 
 
For all the conspicuous academicism of its language, FATU, as David Kennedy so correctly 
reminds us, has managed to pull-off a feat that in the preceding half-century had only ever 
been attempted once: in the ‘early’ works of Myres McDougal.17 It succeeded in formulating 
an entirely new reasoning protocol that could be adopted and used with equal facility by 
legal academics and legal practitioners alike. Crucially, it did this also without drawing at any 
point on the so-called ‘doctrine of sources’ tradition, which, as Schachter remarks, has been 
the main go-to intellectual instrument of the ILP community for most of the last century.18  
 
What is more, in developing its vision of a new routine of legal reasoning, FATU also 
succeeded in developing an entirely new set of analytical idioms for describing, 
conceptualising, and processing the lived reality of international law – a move whose 
importance could hardly be overestimated. By supplementing its macro-level theoretic 
inquiry with the search for a new micro-level analytical vocabulary, FATU went on to pull-off 
something that back in the day had escaped even Kelsen himself: it presented its readers not 
only with the general outline of a fundamentally novel way of thinking about international 
law as a matter of abstract legal theory but also with a perfectly practicable system of 
conceptual instruments using which they could tackle the twin tasks of dissecting and 
problematizing all the various practices and experiences in terms of which the international 
legal practitioner community typically structured its day-to-day existence.  
 
And if all of this had not been enough, on top of everything else, it then also went on to 
articulate a fundamentally new way of understanding the process of developing and 
assessing disciplinary competence in contemporary international law. However 
unpretentious a score this may have seemed on paper, in reality this was truly an 
achievement of colossal proportions, for it allowed the discipline of AILS for the first time in 
more than two generations to respond directly to the historic demands not only of the 
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immediate internal-ideological processes of the ILP community but also of its broader 
project of inter-generational self-reproduction. Anyone who has ever used FATU to teach an 
international law course will recognise immediately the immense intellectual subsidy it 
provided to international law teachers. The general theory of professional aptitude which 
FATU outlined supplied a foundation around which it became possible not only to 
reformulate the conversation about what made international law special or different as a 
field of practice but also to design any number of new educational curricula to help 
introduce this field to its newcomers and outsiders.   
 
What made the achievement of such a remarkable feat possible? The answer, I think, should 
be sought ultimately in FATU’s fundamental structure as an intellectual project. More 
specifically,it has to be sought in its author’s explicit endorsement of the general intellectual 
aesthetics of scientific positivism.19 Whatever else it may have sought to achieve, FATU’s 
single most important objective as a work of legal scholarship was to eradicate all visible 
gaps between ‘legal theory’, ‘legal history’, ‘doctrinal scholarship’, and ‘applied legal 
argument’. The only way in which it could afford to take on that sort of challenge, however, 
was by actively renouncing the one fundamental tenet shared by every species of 
postmodern writing: both in terms of its general theoretical organisation and in terms of its 
basic intellectual ambition, the FATU project energetically and unreservedly endorses the 
concept of producing a theoretical meta-narrative.  
 
The kind of approach adopted in FATU, explains Koskenniemi, ‘seeks only to do what most 
traditional science has always attempted: to provide a parsimonious theory which can be 
used to explain a wide range of apparently different types of phenomena under explicated 
regularities.’20 The goal pursued by promoting such an approach is not that it should 
‘permanently solve the lawyer’s problems for him’; its main attraction rather comes from 
the fact that it promises to ‘produce a therapeutic effect on lawyers frustrated with their 
inability to cope with the indeterminacy of theory and the irrelevance of doctrine.’21 For it is 
only through alleviating that sort of frustrations that we can ever hope to develop not only a 
new ‘descriptive’ but also a new ‘normative [account] of the world in which States live’:22 a 
roadmap that can lead us ‘towards an alternative way of understanding the relationship 
between law and its neighbouring discourses.’23 
 
 
Against the Language Metaphor Reductionism:  
Understanding the Complexity of FATU’s Aspiration 
 
 
                                                          
19 Not that this should be treated as absolute proof, but that this 
endorsement was conscious and deliberate is evidenced, inter alia, by 
Koskenniemi’s own later admissions. See, eg, Martti Koskenniemi, Letter to 
the Editors, 93 AJIL 351 (1999):‘My aim was to examine international law 
from a standpoint that would be in some ways systematic, perhaps even 
scientific.’ 
20 FATU, 13. 
21 Ibid. 
22 Ibid., 12. 
23 Ibid., 13. 
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One of the most enduring myths about FATU over the years has been the argument that as a 
work of legal theory its main analytical goal was essentially just to show that international 
law, in effect, is a quasi-linguistic system that operates according to its own internal logic 
and is organised according to its own ‘rules of grammar’. To prove oneself as a competent 
international legal professional, follows the argument, one has to learn and master these 
rules, since it is only by following them that one can produce in practice what other legal 
professionals would be able to recognise as ‘valid’ international legal statements, and thus 
join a discursive tradition accessible exclusively to international lawyers.  
 
Now, to read the FATU project in this light is not, of course, an entirely unjustified response. 
One can certainly find enough evidence both in the FATU text itself and in the accompanying 
literature, to give support to this line of interpretation. But not every interpretation that 
seems supportable in theory is a good one.  
 
For let us face it: the idea that one can think of international law in terms of some hopelessly 
generalised language/grammar metaphor is not, all things considered, either very interesting 
or very original. In various guises and forms it has been repeated at least since the mid-
1950s: one only needs to look at the works of Alf Ross or the young David Kennedy – or for 
that matter even take a quick peek across the disciplinary divide at some of the early 
writings by Friedrich Kratochwil – to get a general sense of just how widespread and popular 
this pattern of thought really is, historically, in the AILS community.  
 
Nor, come to think of it, is this idea really all that theoretically insightful or critically 
productive. What exactly is one supposed to do as a practising lawyer with the knowledge 
that international law is built like a language? How is this going to help, say, an international 
human rights advocate or a foreign office adviser become better at their job? If the only 
thing that FATU had sought to bring to AILS was the general claim that international law 
could be analogised to a linguistic system, it is safe to presume none of us today would be 
devoting so much time and effort to its study.  
 
Certainly, the idea that the workings of the international legal discourse resemble generally 
those of a linguistically organised system does form an integral part of FATU’s broader 
theoretical argument. But it is definitely not the most important or analytically the most 
noteworthy part of it. For indeed what sets FATU apart from all the other legal-theoretic 
projects that have sought over the years to explore the law-language analogy is, of course, 
the fact that instead of simply putting forward the idea that there may exist such a thing as 
an international legal grammar, it actually tried to give it flesh. Where others before and 
after it had stopped at formulating the concept of an international legal semiotics, FATU 
sought to take the next logical step: by specifying in great meticulous detail, over the course 
of more than 500 pages, just what exactly those rules of international legal grammar actually 
look like in practice, it effectively managed to turn international legal semiotics into a full-
blown ‘applied science’.   
 
To help illustrate how the logic of discourse-production in international law works, FATU also 
introduced its readers to three further sets of analytical instruments. The first two of them – 
the one built around the metaphor of ascending and descending argument patterns and the 
one centred on the dyadic structure apology/utopia – have since received a considerable 
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amount of attention in the FATU literature. But, as I am going to show in this essay, it was, in 
fact, the third of these sets – the one which builds around the old Llewellynian distinction 
between what may seem discursively justifiable as a legal argument and what is actually 
going to ‘wash’ or be argued in legal practice – that captured, ultimately, what was most 
valuable about FATU’s legal-theoretic breakthrough and helped complete the task of 
marrying the enterprise legal semiotics with that of ‘applied legal science’.  
 
 
FATU’s Structuralism: A Point about Intellectual Genealogies 
 
 
None of these analytical metaphors, of course, was to be seen as anything more than a 
convenient heuristic device. And yet every heuristic, in the end, implies a certain set of 
ontological commitments. The basic ontological commitments which were inscribed in 
FATU’s broader argument all have a clearly identifiable theoretical profile. Although there 
may be some surface similarities, the operative analytical framework that matches this 
profile does not trace its intellectual genealogy from the writings of Roberto Unger, Duncan 
Kennedy, or David Kennedy – what Justin Desautels-Stein calls the ‘Harvard school of legal 
structuralism’.24 Rather, it is the shadows of Claude Lévi-Strauss and Michel Foucault – the 
high priests of the French structuralist tradition – that loom most vividly over this part of 
FATU’s intellectual landscape.  
 
To be sure, the footnotes are all still there: the generous reader that he is Koskenniemi does 
not hesitate to acknowledge time and again his extensive debt to the Harvard circle 
scholars. 25 But debts and genealogies are not quite the same thing. The basic intellectual 
reflexes which guided the evolution of FATU’s argument have very little in common with 
those which have been historically associated with the Harvard structuralist tradition. 
Indeed, if anything, the latter’s general theoretical orientation, on closer examination, 
appears to have been influenced far more by the legacies of Hohfeld and Llewellyn as 
processed and refracted through the early writings of Duncan Kennedy,26 than anything one 
might plausibly include as part of the ‘original canon’ of the French structuralist tradition. 
And for all his unquestionably sincere interest in French structuralism, Kennedy’s take on the 
subject was, of course itself in turn deeply over-determined by his personal intellectual 
circumstances: most notably his longstanding interest in the re-appropriation of the various 
                                                          
24 Justin Desautels-Stein, International Legal Structuralism: A Primer, 8 
Int Theory(2016)(forthcoming). 
25 See, eg, FATU, 10, n.7. 
26 See Duncan Kennedy, Form and Substance in Private Law Adjudication, 89 
Harvard LR 1685(1976) and The Structure of Blackstone’s Commentaries, 28 
Buffalo LR 205(1979). See also DUNCAN KENNEDY, THE RISE & FALL OF CLASSICAL LEGAL 
THOUGHT xiv-xxxi (2006)(reviewing some of the historical background 
surrounding rise of the Harvard legal-structuralist project).  
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private law heterodox traditions, from Demogue to Fuller,27 as well as his protracted 
ideological struggle against the CLS Marxists.28  
 
The difference may seem to be one of mere accent or style, but it is, in fact, very important. 
The legal-structuralist project elaborated in FATU has a much closer connection to the 
‘original canon’ of French structuralism – as well as a much more strongly pronounced 
interest in the public law mainstream traditions: Austin, Jellinek, Kelsen, and Schmitt each 
have a named section in its table of contents – than any AILS work associated with the 
Harvard circle. What is more, both in terms of its implied ethics and its broader theoretical 
agenda, the FATU project also seems to be fundamentally uninterested in any kind of 
Sartrean-style existentialist discussions, not to mention what Duncan Kennedy elsewhere 
calls the ‘organicist tradition’ of critical thought.29 Both of these themes, on the other hand, 
have remained central to the intellectual organisation of the Harvard structuralist tradition 
and can be traced across its canon from the very beginning.30  
 
In short, while it seems undeniable that he was greatly inspired by the ‘Harvard school’, the 
actual brand of legal structuralism Koskenniemi develops in FATU comes from a 
fundamentally different genealogy. Even that strange last chapter, where he departs so 
abruptly from the standard structuralist problematic, seems to have been influenced far 
more by the non-structuralist aspects of the Harvard circle’s legacy: it is Unger’s Frankfurt 
School-style reflections on the possibility of post-liberalism in Knowledge and Politics that 
leave the most visible traces here, not Duncan Kennedy’s Structure of Blackstone’s 
Commentaries.31 
 
The reason why it is important to mention this detail is that none of the originators of the 
French structuralist tradition, of course, was a jurist by training. However brilliant their 
insights may have seemed otherwise, if the author of FATU were to succeed in adopting 
their theories for the purposes of constructing a workable account of international law, he 
first had to find for them a suitable jurisprudential host, a background legal-theoretical 
framework into which they could be safely transplanted. When the Harvard circle scholars 
had set out a decade earlier to resolve the same challenge, they turned to Llewellyn, 
Hohfeld, and the early Fuller. The author of FATU, on the other hand, found his solution in 
Kelsen’s Reine Rechtslehre.32  
                                                          
27 Fuller’s work, in particular, seems to have had a very significant impact 
on the evolution of Kennedy’s concept of legal structures. See further 
Duncan Kennedy, From the Will Theory to the Principle of Private Autonomy: 
Fuller’s “Consideration and Form”, 100 Columbia LR 94 (2000). 
28 See Akbar Rasulov, CLS and Marxism: A History of an Affair, 5 TLT 622 
(2014).  
29 Duncan Kennedy, A Semiotics of Critique, 22 Cardozo LR 1147, 1149-57 
(2001). 
30 A partial exception can be found in David Kennedy’s International Legal 
Structures. But its version of legal structuralism in any event had a much 
stronger Derridean flavour and, if only in this respect, was fundamentally 
different from FATU’s. For further discussion of that project, see Akbar 
Rasulov, The Horizontal Mechanism Initiative in the WTO: The Proceduralist 
Turn and Its Discontents, 6 EYbIEL 61,79-83 (2015). 
31 Supra n.26. 
32 HANS KELSEN, INTRODUCTION TO THE PROBLEMS OF LEGAL THEORY (1992).  
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Between Low-grade Cynicism and Eclecticism: FATU’s Wars against the Anti-Disciplinarian 
Agenda in AILS 
 
 
At the most fundamental level, FATU’s emergence as an AILS event can essentially be 
understood as an intensely powerful reaction against two distinct cultural trends: (i) the 
ever-deepening anti-intellectualism popularised by the post-1960 generation of pragmatic 
positivists such as Ian Brownlie, Oscar Schachter, and Louis Henkin; and (ii) light-touch 
interdisciplinarism expounded by the newly emergent international-law-and-international-
relations(ILIR) school.33  
 
At the heart of the first conflict lay a basic disagreement over AILS’s essential disciplinary 
status: was international law a true academic discipline, on a par with other social sciences, 
or was it only a vocation? For all their differences, the old generation of international legal 
positivists – the generation of Kelsen, Anzilotti, and Guggenheim – had at least all shared a 
fundamental meta-ideological commitment to the idea that international law was a ‘real’ 
discipline with a fully-fledged theoretical framework, not just a convenient platform or 
vehicle for the pursuit of international politics. However much they may have disagreed with 
one another, each of them vigorously upheld international law’s intellectual claims and 
ambitions and actively defended the theoretical dignity of positivism as a school of thought. 
To be sure, with the exception of Kelsen, most of them would have never merited inclusion 
in a textbook on general jurisprudence. But at least their discursive posture had always 
retained an unmistakable sense of theoretical ambition and they all positioned themselves 
as self-identifying legal intellectuals who were not afraid to nail their intellectualist colours 
to their professional masts. 
 
By the mid-1980s, this old ethos had dissipated without a trace. The new generation of 
positivist scholars, raised on a steady diet of Cold War pragmatism and post-New Haven 
eclecticism, had lost any interest in ambitious legal-theoretic inquiries. Internalising the 
cultural self-imagery of a mid-level civil servant, they increasingly sought to dismiss the 
pursuit of ‘theory’ – and with it any conversations about international law’s academic status 
– as an essentially frivolous pastime. In a typical turn of phrase, some of them would casually 
go on to observe that international law was really just another kind of politics,34 without 
bothering to explain how and what therefore made it different from other kinds of politics. 
Another frequently used rhetorical move would be to declare simply that international law 
worked35 even if nobody could actually agree on the ultimate reason for its bindingness36 or 
identify the exact degree to which it was effective.37 In any event, the argument continued, 
                                                          
33 STEPHEN KRASNER, INTERNATIONAL REGIMES (1983); ROBERT KEOHANE, AFTER HEGEMONY(1984). 
34 Louis Henkin, ‘International Law: Politics, Values and Functions’, 216 
RCADI 22 (1989-IV). 
35 LOUIS HENKIN, HOW NATIONS BEHAVE 320(1979). 
36 Oscar Schachter, Towards a Theory of International Obligation, 8 VJIL 
300, 302 (1968). 
37 Louis Henkin, The Reports of the Death of Article 2(4) Are Greatly 
Exaggerated, 65 AJIL 544(1971). 
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none of this really mattered: what mattered, rather, was the fact that ‘[t]here [was] no 
doubt room for a whole treatise on the harm caused to the business of legal investigation by 
theory,’ which ‘[w]ith rare exceptions [tends] not only [to] fail[] to improve the quality of 
thought but [also] deflect[] lawyers from the application of ordinary methods of legal 
analysis.’38  
 
For its immediate proponents, this spirit of ardent anti-theoreticism seemed a direct 
outgrowth of the same kind of down-to-earth practitioner-pragmatism that some twenty or 
thirty years prior had stood in such good stead for the likes of Lord McNair. To the eyes of a 
left-leaning Finnish lawyer who had been raised on a steady diet of Kelsen and Ross but also 
Horkheimer and Adorno, what really stood behind the rise of this new breed of cynicism 
seemed to be something else entirely. In other fields, the emergence of this sort of anti-
intellectualist sensibility came to be diagnosed variously as the ‘postmodern condition’, ‘the 
cultural logic of late capitalism’, or the ‘disenchantment of formal rationality’. For the author 
of FATU, however, the answer had a much more familiar face. The rise of pragmato-
positivism in contemporary AILS marked for him the arrival into the ILP’s internal social 
space of the culture of Cynical Reason.  
 
The diffusion of the pragmato-positivist sensibility did not only lead to a progressive 
abandonment of all international law’s traditional theoretical ambitions. In the eyes of the 
FATU project, Brownlie, Henkin, et al. were not simply a group of burned-out old-timers who 
had lost hunger for ‘big ideas’. The elevation of their low-intensity anti-intellectualism to the 
level of disciplinary standard indicated something far more sinister:  
 
The discontent in our culture has assumed a new quality. It appears as 
a universal, diffuse cynicism. … The ancient world knows the cynic … as 
a lone owl and as a provocative, stubborn moralist. Diogenes in the tub 
is the archetype of this figure. In the picture book of social characters 
he has always appeared as a distance-creating mocker …  
Today the cynic appears as a mass figure: an average social 
character in the upper echelons of the elevated superstructure. [The] 
modern cynics … are no longer outsiders. [They] are integrated, asocial 
characters who… no longer understand their way of existing as 
something that has to do with [criticism], but as a participation in a 
collective, realistically attuned way of seeing things. 
Indeed, this is the essential point in modern cynicism: the ability 
of its bearers to work – in spite of anything that might happen, and 
especially, after anything that might happen. …  A certain chic 
bitterness provides an undertone to its activity. For cynics are not 
dumb, and every now and then they certainly see the nothingness to 
which everything [they do] leads. …They know what they are doing, but 
they do it [anyway].39  
 
                                                          
38 Ian Brownlie, Recognition in Theory and Practice, 53 BYIL 1( 1982). 
39 PETER SLOTERDIJK, CRITIQUE OF CYNICAL REASON 3-6(1987) 
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FATU’s most important fight, in the end, however, was not against Brownlie and Henkin. 
They may certainly have been at the top of its author’s list of principal academic targets 
when the project had been first conceived. But they did not, ultimately, become his main 
antagonists. Nor for that matter did their ideology of lowgrade cynical anti-intellectualism 
prove the most significant challenge that confronted the discipline of AILS at the end of the 
Cold War. That dubious honour, rather, belonged to another scholarly movement: the newly 
created, self-declaredly interdisciplinarian ILIR school.40  
 
Like the pragmato-positivists, ILIR scholars shared a number of traits which from the 
perspective of the traditional aesthetics of legal science appeared indistinguishable from 
intellectual nihilism. What separated them from the pragmato-positivist crowd was the fact 
that they seemed ready to extend the exact same kind of cynical instrumentalism which the 
latter applied to individual legal categories and legal regimes, to the very idea of law’s 
disciplinary sovereignty over its own intellectual materials. Stripped to its basics, the central 
argument of the ILIR approach stated that international law – both as a political regime and 
as an academic discipline – stood to gain a considerable amount of practical empowerment 
if it were to import as part of its operative conceptual framework a theoretical apparatus 
developed by IR scholars and subordinate its broader reasoning protocols to the analytical 
regimen imposed by the IR discipline.  
 
Both then and today the most obvious reaction available to the mainstream international 
lawyers in the face of such an aggressive programme of disciplinary denigration would have 
been to interpret the rise of ILIR as the direct application by US-based international law 
scholars to the US-focused segment of AILS of the same strategic blueprint which the US-
based law-and-economics scholars first developed in the context of the US domestic legal-
academic scene. Another equally tempting solution would have been to read the advent of 
the ILIR approach as the proverbial return of the prodigal son. On this view of things, the 
gradual expansion of interest among IR-trained scholars in the subjects of international 
regimes, transgovernmental cooperation, international institutions, and international norm-
production was really just a sign of IR’s inevitable return to the idea that ‘law matters’.  
 
Whatever one may think about the justifiability of these interpretations, neither of these 
responses, in the end, appeared satisfactory to the author of FATU. Writing a decade-and-a-
half after the first edition of FATU, he would come to recognise the rise of ILIR as the 
symptom of a far more sinister development in the history of international law’s disciplinary 
decline as an intellectual enterprise than anything ever proposed by Brownlie or Henkin. The 
‘culture of dynamism’ that the ILIR scholars sought to bring to international law’s dry 
epistemic quarters, he would now argue, was something more than just an attempt at an 
epistemological intervention: it was a façade for the argument for ‘the ultimate irrelevance 
of law’ and the denial of the most basic values of the Enlightenment: freedom, equality, 
‘openness to what others have to say’.41 Pushed to its extreme, its programme of eclectic 
                                                          
40 Kenneth Abbott, Modern International Relations Theory: a Prospectus for 
International Lawyers, 14 YJIL 335 (1989); Anne-Marie Slaughter Burley, 
International Law and International Relations: A Dual Agenda, 87 AJIL 205 
(1993); Anne-Marie Slaughter, ‘International Law and International 
Relations’, 285 RCADI 9 (2000). 
41 MARTTI KOSKENNIEMI, GENTLE CIVILIZER OF NATIONS 500-1 (2001). 
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interdisciplinarism led its followers to a heady mix of cynicism and moral pathos that was 
‘only a step removed from underwriting the preferences of the Western foreign policy 
elite.’42 
 
Coming on the tails of pragmato-positivism’s renunciation of AILS’s traditional theoretical 
ambitions, ILIR’s dismissal of international law’s indigenous theoretical apparatus as being 
de facto ‘unfit for purpose’ threatened to bring AILS as a discipline to the precipice of 
complete political and intellectual self-annihilation. If such a disastrous outcome were to be 
prevented, followed the inevitable conclusion, a most robust counteroffensive had to be 
launched.  
 
The ‘aggressor’ whose attacks were to be defended against was not hard to identify: the 
ultimate source of both pragmato-positivism and the ILIRian deviation was the same diffuse 
cultural trend that had been described by Lyotard a decade earlier. It was postmodernism 
‘what dunnit’ in FATU’s eyes and there was no time to beat around the bush:  
 
As international lawyers, we have failed to use the imaginative 
possibilities open to us. We became suspicious of theory because it 
made claims of comprehensiveness and normativity which it could not 
sustain. Our practice [as a result became] marginalized … Instead of 
impartial umpires …, we were cast as players in [somebody else’s] game 
… It is not that we need to play the game better, or more self-
consciously. We need to re-imagine the game [and] reconstruct its 
rules.43 
 
So far, so good, but notice now an important detail. Having arrived at this conclusion, 
Koskenniemi does not proceed to draw from it the same set of take-aways as most other 
AILS traditionalists.44 Since it was not the postmodernism of theory that lay at the root of 
international law’s malady, but the postmodernism of practice, writing angry diatribes 
against relativism, nihilism, and decisionism was not going to accomplish anything useful. If 
the source of the problem lay in the de facto postmodernization of AILS’s disciplinary 
culture, then the only effective response to that was to start an opposing project of cultural 
re-engineering: the key, to go back to Lopez-Medina’s useful distinction, was to target 
international law’s discourses of ‘pop jurisprudence’, not the rarefied conversations of 
professional legal theorists. 
 
What did all of this mean in concrete terms? To anyone steeped in the Frankfurt tradition, 
the answer was perfectly obvious: the end-goal was to create a new internal ideology for 
international law as a disciplinary enterprise to be internalised with equal effectiveness both 
by the academic and the practitioner segments of the ILP. What this translated to in terms of 
concrete strategy, for the author of FATU, ultimately, came down to two main points: (i) the 
                                                          
42 Martti Koskenniemi, ‘Legal Universalism’, in SINKWAN CHENG, LAW, JUSTICE, AND 
POWER 46, 59(2004). 
43 FATU,561. 
44 Compare Oliver Gerstenberg, What International Law Should (Not) Become: A 
Comment on Koskenniemi, 16 EJIL 125(2005); Pierre-Marie Dupuy, Some 
Reflections: A Response to Martti Koskenniemi, 16 EJIL 131 (2005). 
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final objective was to trigger a radical shift in the (newly) established consensus about 
international law’s ‘disciplinary ethics’; and (ii) the best way to achieve this was to induce 
the emergence of what in his later writings he would call the ‘culture of formalism’ but 
which at this point would probably be much more accurately described as a culture of 
unashamed disciplinarism, or to steal a line from Althusser, a culture of unashamed anti-
anti-disciplinarism. 
 
But what does it take to pull off something like that in practice? How does one trigger intra-
disciplinary cultural shifts in professional legal communities? What does one need to do to 
cause a cultural revolutionof that kind? Koskenniemi’s answer to this challenge can be 
deduced from the general structure of the FATU narrative itself. The first step, evidently, was 
to articulate a new concept of international law’s objective identity as a matter of formal 
theoretical statement. The goal was to show through a careful and explicitly theoreticist 
argument international law’s fundamental uniqueness and singularity as a system(in the 
Luhmanian sense of the term). In the context of the book’s narrative, this task is performed 
by Chapter 1. Given that international law’s disciplinary culture resides not at the level of 
‘high legal theory’, but at the level of pop jurisprudence, the next step in the strategy was to 
entrench this newly unveiled concept by putting it into practice. The essential task at this 
point was to demonstrate the fundamental effectiveness of the new theory by illustrating its 
practical applicability over and over, across as many areas and contexts as possible - treaty 
interpretation (Chapter 5.2), recognition of states (Chapter 4.6), territorial disputes(Chapter 
4.7), NIEO(Chapter 7.2), the law of custom (Chapter 6), the writings of leading authors and 
publicists(Chapters 2 and 3), etc.  
 
A relatively uncontroversial ‘war plan’, all things considered. But controversy – like brilliance 
and genius – in legal scholarship rarely comes through at the level of general plans. It was 
not so much the basic contours of what it tried to pull off but the particular manner in which 
it went about doing it which gave the FATU project its distinctive identity: the key to 
reverting the course of international law’s cultural postmodernization for the author of FATU 
was to produce a distinctly modernist account of the international legal reality by deploying 
a distinctly modernist – from the point of view of legal scholarly practices – discursive move. 
Having been raised in a tradition of legal thought focused so prominently around Kelsen and 
Ross and having been exposed for such a long time to the writings of Frankfurt scholars and 
the French structuralists, in retrospect it seems only logical that when it came to deciding on 
the means by which to prosecute his ‘war plan’ against international legal postmodernism, 
the author of FATU would elect to publish a book whose message was built on the same 
intellectual platform as the old Kelsenian project of ‘pure legal theory’ and verbalised in the 
neo-Saussurean vernacular of Levi-Straussian uber-formalism.  
 
It seems logical and self-evident now – but think how strange and dubious this strategy must 
have seemed in the context of its times! To save international law from postmodernization, 
to restore the discipline’s sense of theoretical dignity and intellectual ambition by marrying 
Kelsen and ‘high French theory’ – what was he even thinking? 
 
 
FATU on the Inner Mechanics of International Law: Positivism with a Structuralist Twist 
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The first tenet at the heart of FATU’s new theoretical framework was also its most 
intellectually conservative element. In its general contours, it can be considered a direct 
logical extension of the old positivist thesis that ‘all legal constructs are manmade’.  
 
Every species of legal constructs – of which positivism knows three basic varieties: legal 
concepts, rules, and doctrines – is a product of human creation. That is to say, every object 
which is used or reflected upon in the course of legal reasoning that is not a rule of formal 
logic is a posited imaginary. It has no objective source outside the legal domain. It cannot be 
derived from the ‘natural state of things’, nor from the inherent structures of ‘pure reason’. 
What is more, it has no correlating counterpart in the world outside the legal domain either. 
There is no such ‘thing’, outside law, as a ‘trespass’, a ‘corporation’, or a ‘closed multilateral 
treaty’. Even if one should recognise as a matter of objective reality the existence of various 
corresponding patterns of social and physical events to which these categories may be 
applied for the purposes of legal analysis, the process of this application would not, on this 
view of things, ultimately be decided by the objective qualities of those events themselves 
but by the conditions of the respective part of the legal domain.  
 
The idea that all legal constructs should be treated as imaginary fictions is not, of course, 
very novel, but it has two important theoretical implications for the purposes of the FATU 
project. In the first place, as already suggested, it indicates that we can’t, ultimately, find any 
objective reality behind any given set of legal concepts, rules, or doctrines that are used in 
international law that will be independent of the collective imagination of the ILP which has 
called these constructs into existence. In the second place, it indicates also that none of 
these constructs can have any inherent or self-evident meaning: from an ontological point of 
view, they are all just imaginary artefacts created by international lawyers to help describe 
whatever discernible regularities in the organisation of the respective set of legal processes 
these lawyers are used to distinguishing and investing with significance when talking among 
themselves.  
 
Like empty universals in nominalist philosophy, rules, concepts, and doctrines do not have 
any fixed external referents or fixed internal cores. There is, consequently, nothing 
perpetual, privileged, or objective about their content: they are all empty floating signifiers 
as Ernesto Laclau would have said. The only thing which really exists ‘out there’ when we 
speak about the doctrine of state immunity, a right of innocent passage, or the concept of 
actionable subsidy in the law of the WTO is just a series of relatively stable patterns of 
analytical classification according to which the respective groups of international lawyers 
order and administer the relations among the respective subjects of international law. None 
of these patterns exists outside the collective mind of the ILP; none of them, furthermore, is 
governed by any kind of external or internal logic. What sort of content may be included 
under any of these rubrics can never be established in abstracto. Nor can it be fixed 
conclusively and permanently. The configuration of every pattern (and thus the semantic 
content of the corresponding construct) will always remain arbitrary and capable of shifting 
at any given moment.  
 
In traditional European jurisprudence, this way of thinking is most frequently identified with 
the idea of legal positivism. In the broader history of legal thought, however, this set of ideas 
17 
 
has also been described in the past under the rubric of functionalism.45 Functionalism in its 
standard formulation is essentially a school of thought based around two basic sets of 
assumptions. First, the reality of every abstract social construct, such as, say, money, 
sovereignty, or territory, consists only in the scope of its present practical functionality: 
‘money is what money does’, ‘a rose by any other name’, etc. Second, the concept of 
‘functionality’ here has to be understood in the sense of whatever set of conditions and 
consequences the broader system of social processes in the context of which the given 
construct is currently used normally comes to associate with it. To go back to our earlier 
example: a treaty is that whichever in the context of the contemporary international legal 
practice acts and functions like a treaty; the meaning of ‘state immunity’ is found solely in 
those conditions and consequences which are associated with the use of this construct in 
contemporary international legal practice; the doctrine of anticipatory self-defence has 
precisely that content which the contemporary system of international legal practice has 
come to assign to it, and so on and so forth.  
 
Note an important nuance: which particular set of functions a given legal construct will be 
assigned can never be determined ex ante and in abstracto. Functions are not an intrinsic 
component of the objective reality: they do not exist, like Kantian objects, in-themselves. 
They belong, rather, in the category of observer-defined attributes: they are something that 
we create through the power of our intersubjective consensuses.46 Given that an 
intersubjective consensus in practice can only form as part of some background set of 
shared collective expectations, it follows from this that every function can essentially be 
understood as an individuated articulation of some larger, pre-existing collectively shared 
frame of reference which is itself neither a reflection of some natural order of things nor a 
projection of pure formal logic, but is rather a product of an entirely conventional origin.  
 
It should not be too difficult to recognise where this line of reasoning leads. Thus posed, the 
idea of legal positivism/functionalism on some basic level becomes effectively synonymous 
with Saussurean semiotics: what one tradition sees as functions, the other calls signifiers; 
what one thinks of as the use of legal constructs, the other describes as parole; the system 
of the underlying communal expectations shared by the participants of the international 
legal process becomes langue, the idea that legal constructs only make sense within the 
context of legal domain seamlessly morphs into the thesis that meaning is created through 
difference not reference, and so on and so forth.  
 
In its opening pages, FATU declares:  
 
[the argument proposed here relies on] a certain vision about the meaning of 
(legal) concepts. … Meaning is not(as we commonsensically assume it to be) 
present in the expression itself. … The sense of an expression is not 
determined ‘from the inside’ but by the formal differences which separate it, 
make it different from other expressions in that langue. Meaning is 
relational.47 
                                                          
45 Felix Cohen, Transcendental Nonsense and the Functional Approach, 35 
Columbia LR 809(1935).  
46 JOHN SEARLE, CONSTRUCTION OF SOCIAL REALITY 9-23(1995). 
47 FATU, 8-9. 
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At the end of the book Koskenniemi returns to the same theme again: ‘There is ... no 
“objective” meaning to the linguistic expressions of rules.’48 ‘We cannot convince someone 
who disagrees with our interpretation by referring to the correspondence between our 
interpretation and the expression’s “real” extraconceptual meaning.’49  
 
The reason why we should pay attention to this fact, explains Koskenniemi, is obvious: all 
throughout international law’s history every pursuit of disciplinary identity has been fuelled 
precisely by this discovery. Every attempt to articulate the essence of the ‘juristic method’ 
turns eventually into the quest to find an ‘impartial guarantor’ of meaning, ‘a solid 
epistemological foundation’.50 But in a world that no longer believes in theology, every such 
quest inevitably ends the same way: any form of interpretive stability in an international 
legal system can only be achieved through the conventional stabilisation of the respective 
aspects of the interpretative process, that is to say, through the ossification of the 
underlying communal consensuses within the ILP through the mechanism of social 
conventions. Inasmuch as there exists any kind of ‘autonomous’ order of international legal 
ideas, it always remains ‘firmly embedded in international legal education and the 
professional self-understanding of international lawyers’ and nothing more mysterious or 
grandiose than that. It is this fact – and this fact alone – that ‘establishes the identity of the 
legal field’ and gives its accompanying conceptual materials their fundamental structure.51  
 
**** 
 
The second principal tenet at the core of FATU’s legal-theoretical framework can also be 
understood as a variation on a traditional positivist theme. Its central point of reference 
comes from an idea which in other fields of legal study has come to be known under the 
rubric of the bundle of rights tradition.52  
 
The argument that legal constructs don’t have any fixed essences behind them is often 
understood as simply suggesting that all legal constructs are semantically unstable. A more 
accurate interpretation, however, would be that the reason why legal constructs don’t seem 
to have any fixed objects behind them actually comes from the fact that every such object in 
reality is not a single monolithic entity but a composite arrangement of structurally discrete 
elements – or to be more precise, a speculative claim about such an arrangement.  
 
Whenever international lawyers make appeal to the concept of state immunity or invoke the 
doctrine of pari passu or the right of national treatment, what they really do in practice, 
according to this view of things, is just put forward a certain vision about how the 
corresponding cluster of international relations ought to be, in principle, configured. They 
argue, in other words, about how the respective package of what in Hohfeldian terms one 
                                                          
48 Ibid.,531. 
49 Ibid. 
50 Ibid.,521. 
51 Ibid.,534. 
52 JOSEPH SINGER, ENTITLEMENT 9-13 (2000); STUART BANNER, AMERICAN PROPERTY 45-80 
(2011). 
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would call rights, duties, liberties, and no-rights(RDLN) are, have been, or ought to be, 
distributed among the respective legal actors.  
 
Every legal construct, on this view of things, essentially only constitutes an argument about 
how the respective package of RDLN ought to be configured. Its ontology, in other words, is 
not that of an ontological fact but only of a purported statement about it: a legal rule is not a 
constituent element of some invisible larger whole that exists independently and objectively 
(the law-in-itself) as a collection of such kind of elements. The linguistic usages we have 
developed – ‘the Court’s judgment clarified the meaning of rule X’, ‘the new treaty extended 
the scope of principle Y’, ‘the respondent challenged the applicability of doctrine Z’ – often 
invite us to think otherwise. But this is all just an illusion: in reality each of these usages is 
nothing more than a convenient pragmatic device that helps us to simplify the process of 
articulating our discourses. The actual ontology of international law consists in the fact that 
rules, concepts, and doctrines don’t formally exist in or as themselves,53 i.e. separately from 
the imaginative games played by the ILP.54 That is to say, what actually comes into existence 
each time we speak of, say, the creation of a new legal rule, the application of a doctrine, or 
the invocation of a concept, is just a shift in the arrangement of that posited imagined reality 
which the ILP operates and inhabits.  
 
Push this idea to its logical conclusion and what you get is another standard Saussurean 
thesis: in ontological terms, every legal rule constitutes nothing more than a heavily 
encoded, ostensibly descriptive statement concerning the best way to distribute a certain 
bundle of RDLN among a respective group of legal actors. What makes this kind of 
statements special from the linguistic point of view is that they seek to portray the 
respective bundles as hypostatized entities. Thus, instead of ‘admitting’ that the provision 
captured in Article 51 of the UN Charter seeks only to propose a certain distribution of RDLN, 
the rules-centric linguistic tradition adopted by the ILP suggests that we imagine that this 
provision represents the existence of a certain objective entity: the rule of Article 51.  
 
The same logic which applies to rules also applies to doctrines: whenever we speak about 
doctrines what we really have in mind is just another set of similarly encoded statements. 
The only difference is that of the formal order of abstraction: if legal rules are first-order 
statements about RDLN, doctrines are second-order statements. Every time we discuss the 
meaning or the applicability of, say, the doctrine of the permanent sovereignty over natural 
resources or R2P, what we really do in practice is just put forward arguments about how 
best to organise the respective clusters of international legal rules, i.e. how to distribute the 
respective sets of first-order statements about the underlying bundle of RDLN.  
 
Now, all this may seem abstract and vague, but watch now where this line of thought takes 
us next. From the traditional positivist point of view, a legal concept would be the term we 
would use to describe those semantic blocks which lawyers recruit to help develop and 
articulate their understanding of the respective sets of legal rules and doctrines, i.e. to 
articulate the respective statements about the underlying bundles of RDLN. So far, so very 
                                                          
53 FATU, 568-9.  
54 ‘Law is what lawyers think about and how they go about using it in their 
work’. Ibid.,569. 
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Kelsenian, but note now what happens when we process this idea through the Saussurean 
filter. Since no semantic block, per Saussure, can perform its function as a semantic block 
when it is taken in isolation from other similarly positioned semantic blocks, it follows that 
every legal concept rather than being seen simply as an instrument for the articulation of 
legal rules and doctrines should be understood, in fact,also as a certain kind of encoded 
statement, i.e. as a dynamic act of socially-grounded discursivity rather than a static entity 
that exists in some transcendental fashion.   
 
The next question to ask at this point then becomes: an encoded statement about what? 
Given the fact that the ultimate purpose of every legal concept, as noted earlier, is to help us 
articulate the respective sets of legal rules and doctrines, it follows, logically, that the object 
of each legal concept(taken as a statement), inevitably, has to be an argument about how 
those rules and doctrines(each of which is also a statement) are distributed and related to 
one another. Put differently, every time we invoke a given legal concept, what we really do 
in practice is just put forward a series of statements about how another series of statements 
should be understood.  
 
Let us pause for a moment here and retrace our steps.  
 
1. Note, for starters, what this sequence of observations has done to the traditional 
operative concepts of legal positivism. Note what has appeared and what has disappeared 
from the traditional positivist ontology after we have worked our way through this analysis. 
Disappeared: static constructs(rules, doctrines, and concepts as hypostatised entities). 
Appeared: dynamic actions(statements). Disappeared: any fundamental distinction between 
rules, doctrines, and concepts. Appeared: awareness that everything in law is just one single, 
messy process/field of discursivity. Disappeared: any room for the idea that a legal order can 
exist in- or by itself, separately from the legal profession. Appeared: awareness that 
everything that exists in law exists because of and through the demands of whatever social 
processes occur within the legal profession.  
 
2. Rules are statements about RDLN. Doctrines are statements about rules. Legal concepts 
are statements that we use to develop statements about rules and doctrines. Rights, duties, 
and liberties are all legal concepts. Put these four thoughts together and what emerges is 
the idea that every legal construct used in international law is ultimately a product of the 
exact same source. Everything that on its surface seems to be a representation of a ‘thing 
that is’ in reality is only a statement about ‘what that thing may be’. Push this idea a little 
further and what you get, eventually, is the notion that even though it was said earlier that 
every rule, doctrine, and concept is actually just an encoded statement about the respective 
bundle of RDLN, what we really should have said was that every rule, doctrine, and concept is 
actually an abstract continuum of possible statements regarding that bundle. Every 
deployment of a legal concept, doctrine, or rule in international law is a coded invocation of 
a certain vision – one among many visions that could be invoked at this point – of the 
underlying bundle of RDLN. Inasmuch, furthermore, as every such deployment is different in 
its intention and content from other deployments, this means in practice that: (i) no legal 
concept, doctrine, or rule can have its precise legal meaning fixed in abstracto because every 
invocation of it will automatically entail a certain reconfiguration of its contents; and (ii) it 
doesn’t make any sense to focus on contesting or excavating the ‘general meaning’ of such 
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constructs, since the real dynamic is always going to be played out at the level of the 
underlying bundles of RDL.  Or, to put it slightly more bluntly, concepts, doctrines, and rules 
don’t carry any practical meaning in law, only the respective RDLN bundles do, and each of 
these bundles itself, in the end, is nothing more than a normative proposition about the 
distribution of power within a respective cluster of international relations.  
 
Once again the extent of Kelsen’s influence on FATU’s thought-world is difficult to overlook 
or overestimate. From his remarks on the inter-permeability of law-application and law-
making(both are just forms of making an argument about how the respective regime of RDL 
ought to be structured)55 to his discussions of ‘frames of possibilities’(every legal norm 
‘exists’ only as a range of plausible interpretations and it is at this level that the practical 
reality of law-application unfolds),56 Kelsen’s conceptual framework peeks out from behind 
every corner.   
 
The secret of becoming a good legal professional, declares Koskenniemi at the end of FATU, 
lies in accepting the phantasmal character of all legal constructs. In practice, this entails 
 
a refusal to engage in discussions about general principles … Rather than 
be normative in the whole [one] should be normative in the small. [One 
should] attempt, to the best of [one’s] capability, to isolate the issues 
which are significant in conflict, assess them with an impartial mind and 
offer a solution which seems best to fulfil the demands of [one’s 
situation].57  
 
The argument against the reification of omnibus concepts and monolithic categories has a 
long pedigree in modern jurisprudence. It also has a rather extensive history of criticism 
associated with it. Giving up on the idea that abstract concepts and normative principles 
such as ‘justice’ or ‘non-intervention’ do not have any legal effectivity and should not 
therefore be invested with any emancipatory expectations has long been identified as the 
guaranteed recipe for closing off any spaces of dissent and entrenching tyranny. Does the 
switch to the ‘bundle-ist’ way of thinking about international law not bring with it a certain 
form of disempowerment? Once more FATU offers its readers no easy answers:  
 
Does [it not] imply losing a commitment to the whole, to peace and world 
order? No, but it does force us into seeing that commitment in a new light. 
It is not a commitment which seeks to realize given principle or ready-made 
social arrangements. [Rather i]t aims to construct the whole as a structure 
of open political conflict and constant institutional revision. The whole 
[which is international law is] a system [of] particularized solutions. … 
Beyond [this,] it makes no pretention to offer principles of the good life 
which would be valid in a global way.58 
 
                                                          
55 See HANS KELSEN, GENERAL THEORY OF LAW AND STATE 133-5 (2006);KELSEN, supra n32, 
70. 
56 Ibid.,80. 
57 FATU, 555. 
58 Ibid.,556. 
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FATU’s third main tenet is a direct extension of the same credo of relentless anti-
foundationalism. Statements about RDLN, it argues, don’t really exist ‘in themselves’, but 
only as the actualisations of a certain ‘frame of possibilities’ that is put in place by the 
respective paradigm. Every legal concept, doctrine, or rule, in the final analysis, constitutes 
not so much a statement about the respective bundle of RDLN, as a representation of a 
certain range of possible normative contestations within which such statements are 
developed and actualised.  
 
All rules, doctrines, and concepts known to international law are just statements whose 
objects of references consist of other statements. Scratch the surface of international law’s 
self-presented reifications and you will find nothing there other than an endless, chaotic 
process of interpretative clashes, projections, contestations, and speculations. Everything is 
in flux and nothing is static. Not even the boundaries that are meant to separate one ‘frame 
of possibilities’ from another can be said to be stable. Indeed, taken to its logical conclusion, 
FATU’s theory of law inevitably brings us to the conclusion that the only factor that can be 
said plausibly to separate the process of normative contestation surrounding, say, the 
principle of non-intervention from that surrounding the duty of national treatment is the 
appearance of a general differentiation in the purported identities of the respective ‘objects’ 
of reference at the centre of the respective contestational processes. The interpretative 
contestations behind ‘non-intervention’ have as their purported object of 
discussion/production the meaning of ‘non-intervention’; the interpretative contestations 
underlying ‘national treatment’ have as their object the meaning of ‘national treatment’. 
Beyond this, there is nothing. 
 
Seen from this angle, FATU’s intellectual enterprise turns effectively into an argument for 
the recognition of the essential unavoidability of ontological fizziness. Behind every legal 
concept, doctrine, or rule lies not just a certain vision of how the respective bundle of RDL 
ought to be arranged and distributed, but an endless cascade of multiple different visions 
that constantly change their content, focus, and intensity – and there is nothing we can do 
to repair or end this state of affairs. The point may seem sufficiently abstract at first to justify 
being classed as a purely theoretical insight, but it is here, in fact, I believe, that we finally 
begin to arrive at FATU’s applied-science moment.  
 
The thesis that international law can be understood as a system of pure discursivity has long 
been a part of the received wisdom for various segments of the international legal academy. 
What FATU does to it in this part of its argument – to use a fancy post-structuralist label – is 
put it conceptually sous rature. That is to say, it simultaneously deploys this idea ‘at its face 
value’ and at the same time actively disproves it by showing its fundamental 
unsustainability. For what may seem at first glance a formal field of pure discursivity, it 
argues, is in reality nothing like that at all: peer long enough and what you will discover 
behind this fake façade of emotionless reasoning is a mad, never-ending scramble that has 
no internal logic, no aim, no pattern, no rationality, nor any sense of a pre-determined 
outcome. And yet for all its frenzied and chaotic character, it adds immediately, there can 
still be found in this endless scramble a certain sense of immanent rhythm which helps, in 
the final analysis, make it both generally intelligible and practically manageable for every 
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professionally trained international lawyer. It is this rhythm that he has in mind to teach his 
readers when he sets out to discuss with them the ‘grammar of the international legal 
argument’: a rhythm at the root of which he posits lies a certain set of ‘quasi-physical’ laws.   
 
 
The Inner Life of International Law: FATU’s Theory of the Rules of Engagement for the 
Conduct of International Legal Argument  
 
 
Again, the main idea here may not seem very novel. At some level it just seems to be an 
extension of the old Kelsenian thesis that insofar as every act of applying or interpreting a 
given legal rule inevitably leads to the act of implicitly creating a new rule59 the business of 
legal interpretation is, in principle, indistinguishable from that of legislative advocacy. The 
practice of ‘saying how things are’ is essentially the same as ‘arguing about how they ought 
to be’. But what sort of arguing are we talking about here? In the Harvard structuralist 
tradition, the usual answer to this question would be ‘policy reasoning’: a practice that is 
defined as the production of ‘argument[s] in favour of or against a particular resolution of a 
gap, conflict, or ambiguity in the system of legal rules’ or the understanding of a legal 
concept or doctrine that make appeal to some broader systemic values, such as formal 
realisability or institutional competence, or some substantive, quasi-moral ideals, such as 
self-reliance or good faith.60  
 
The explanation offered in FATU takes a slightly different angle. Instead of conceptualising 
the phenomenon in question as a species of moral reasoning or a discourse about 
institutional design, the FATU approach explains it as a discourse that (i) looks from the 
proposed interpretations of the contested constructs ‘to their underlying reasons’; and (ii) in 
doing so invites us to make a choice between a number of otherwise equally valid normative 
interpretations.61 
 
Every valid statement in contemporary international law, argues FATU, has to be supported 
by a justificatory argument constructed according to either what it calls the ascending model 
or the descending model.62 In the former case, the proposed interpretation of the given legal 
construct is put forward on the grounds that it would best fit with the existing patterns of 
state practice; in the latter, because it would supposedly best promote the achievement of 
some broader value, such as due process or human dignity, or some other fundamentally 
important principle recognised by international law.  
 
Because of the way international law’s intellectual culture has developed over the last two 
centuries, both the ascending and the descending strategies are recognised today as 
disciplinarily valid.63 This means that at every given point in the construction of our 
argument we can resort to either one of them with equal legitimacy. The tricky part, 
                                                          
59 KELSEN, supra n.32,70. 
60 Duncan Kennedy, Semiotics of Legal Argument, 42 Syracuse LR 75 (1991) 
(italics added). 
61 FATU, 591. 
62 Ibid., 59. 
63 Ibid., 575. 
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however, is that ‘the two patterns ... are ... mutually exclusive’.64 As a result, every time we 
put forward an argument constructed according to one pattern, it will be possible 
immediately to challenge it by demonstrating its fundamental incompatibility with the other 
pattern and vice versa. What is more, even if we decide to diversify our approach by 
assembling our argument as a bundle made of several different argument-blocks, the 
problem is still going to remain: inasmuch as every individual block will remain formally 
severable from the rest of the argument-bundle, a sufficiently skilled opponent will only 
have to figure out how to disassemble this bundle into its constituent blocks before 
attacking each block constructed according to the descending logic by showing its 
fundamental incompatibility with the ascending model, etc.  
 
What is the practical relevance of all these observations? Recall what has been noted earlier:  
 
(i) every legal construct ‘in reality’ exists only in the form of the corresponding set of 
arguments about the respective bundle of RDLN;  
(ii) there exists no natural logic which dictates how each RDLN bundle ought to be 
configured in practice; 
(iii) every legal construct can also be understood in practice as the representation of 
a certain segment of that mad, never-ending scramble of normative contestation 
which constitutes the living reality of the international legal discourse; 
(iv) the practice of normative contestation in international law has an internal 
structure: there exist only two valid approaches to constructing justificatory 
arguments in international law, they are mutually incompatible but also equally 
valid in terms of their systemic legitimacy, against every descending argument, it 
will always be possible to construct an ascending counterargument and vice 
versa.  
 
Put these four ideas together and what you get is the simple but very powerful insight: every 
legal concept, doctrine, and rule used in modern international law can be understood, for 
ontological purposes, not only as the representation of a certain segment of normative-
contestational process, but also as a crystalline-style structure of strictly ordered 
antagonisms.65 Each branch of this crystalline structure represents a site of potential 
contestational eruption, i.e. a pre-structured rhetorical space for the conduct of 
interpretative scrambles governed by the rules of engagement described in thesis (iv) above.  
 
Every argument-block constructed according to the rules of the ascending approach can be 
critiqued from the point of view of the descending approach and vice versa. Since we cannot 
consistently privilege either approach over the other, every argument we construct in 
practice will have to become a bundle comprised of a series of differently-modelled 
argument-blocks.  
 
The more the argument-bundle includes both utopian and apologist argument-blocks, the 
more self-contradictory its overall justificatory basis will become, the more vulnerable, in 
                                                          
64 Ibid., 42. 
65 Cf. J.M.Balkin, The Crystalline Structure of Legal Thought, 39 Rutgers LR 
1(1986). 
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consequence, the interpretation we will be putting forward will be to what in the old CLS 
vocabulary was called ‘trashing’ operations.66 It doesn’t take any special skill to trash an 
argument-bundle. Every skilled lawyer with a minimum of training can in principle trash any 
number of argument-bundles, no matter how skilfully designed and put-together. All that 
one has to do is simply disassemble each given argument-bundle into its constituent 
argument blocks and how to identify the operative identity of every block in terms of its 
descending/ascending mechanics; beyond that, it is all just a question of practice and 
experience.  
 
Consider the placement of the emphasis, though: just because ‘in principle’ there exists the 
possibility that every descending argument-block will be trashed from the ascending position 
and vice versa, it does not at all follow that this possibility is necessarily going to be used. 
Some lawyers will simply lack the knowledge of the relevant precedential material to give 
their skeleton (counter-)arguments the necessary legal flesh; others will not be able to 
afford the political costs associated with endorsing certain argument lines.  
 
Not everything that can be challenged, in other words, will be challenged. At the end of the 
day, notes FATU, the process of trashing, like that of reaching a consensus, is governed by a 
purely social logic, and there exist no inherent legal criteria that dictate when and how social 
logics will play out.67  
 
Behind every legal construct there extends a certain field of normative-contestational 
possibilities whose outer limits coincide with the limits of its potential interpretability. The 
shape of this field can be identified in abstracto through the study of the juridical-conceptual 
structure of the applicable legal materials and the technical understanding of the workings 
of the ascending/descending patterns structure. What cannot be so identified, however, is 
just how much of that field will actually be usable (and used) in practice at particular points 
in history. Answering this sort of questions, however, falls, for FATU, far outside the proper 
province of legal studies: when one reaches this point, the ‘grammar’ of the international 
legal discourse inevitably collapses into its ‘social world’,68 and about that there is nothing 
more for legal science to say.69  
 
Note the obvious symbolism of the proposed formulation: ‘grammar’ versus the ‘social 
world’. What we are witnessing here, in effect, is the ultimate divide between Kelsen and 
Holmes, the point where the strict formalism of European legal science meets the solutions-
oriented eclecticism of American legal realism.  
 
Note how pithily FATU formulates the theoretical location of this meeting point. Note also 
on which side of this divide it chooses to position itself.70    
                                                          
66 Mark Kelman, Trashing, 36 Stanford LR 293 (1984).  
67 FATU, 598. 
68 Ibid.,596-8. 
69  Cf.Ludwig Wittgenstein, Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus 89 (2002): ‘What 
we cannot speak about we must pass over in silence.’ 
70 FATU, 589:‘the descriptive project of [this book] is not an account of 
how legal decisions are made – it is about how they are justified in 
argument.’ 
